Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 37 | Number 4

Article 3

2011

IQBAL SIGNALS BIVENS’ PERIL: A CALL
FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Megan Gephart
Fordham University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
Recommended Citation
Megan Gephart, IQBAL SIGNALS BIVENS’ PERIL: A CALL FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, 37 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1057
(2011).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol37/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

IQBAL SIGNALS BIVENS’ PERIL: A CALL FOR CONGRESSIONAL
ACTION
Cover Page Footnote

I would like to thank Professor Ian Weinstein for inspiring and advising this Note and Professors Michael M.
Martin and John Pfaff for their valuable input and review. I would also like to thank those close to me for their
support and encouragement throughout the Note-writing process.

This article is available in Fordham Urban Law Journal: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol37/iss4/3

GEPHART_CHRISTENSEN

10/13/2010 6:53 PM

IQBAL SIGNALS BIVENS’ PERIL: A CALL FOR
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Megan Gephart*
Introduction ............................................................................................. 1057
I. The Shifting Attitude of the Court toward Bivens ............................. 1059
A. The History of Bivens ............................................................ 1059
B. The Current Court’s Attitude Toward Bivens ........................ 1063
C. Given that Bivens is Disfavored, What Options Does the
Court or Congress Have? ....................................................... 1067
II. Arguments for and Against a Codification of Bivens ...................... 1068
A. Arguments for Replacing Bivens by Statute .......................... 1068
B. Arguments Against Replacing Bivens by Statute .................. 1071
III. Congress Should Adopt a Statute to Replace Bivens ...................... 1072
A. Where Clearly Established Law has Been Violated, a
Cause of Action Should be Available Against the
Offending Agent .................................................................... 1074
B. Absent a Violation of Clearly Established Law, a Cause of
Action Against the Government Should Exist for
Violations of an Individual’s Constitutional Rights .............. 1077
C. Flat Non-Pecuniary Damage Award Option.......................... 1080
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 1081
INTRODUCTION
In May 2009, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in a case that
could have severely limited the availability of causes of action against federal agents who, in their capacity as government actors, violate the constitutional rights of individuals.
The case, known as Ashcroft v. Iqbal,1 arose in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.2 The suit was brought by a man named
*
J.D. Candidate, 2011, Fordham University School of Law; B.B.A., 2007, University of
Georgia. I would like to thank Professor Ian Weinstein for inspiring and advising this Note
and Professors Michael M. Martin and John Pfaff for their valuable input and review. I
would also like to thank those close to me for their support and encouragement throughout
the Note-writing process.
1. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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Javaid Iqbal, a citizen of Pakistan, who was arrested on charges of fraud
related “to identification documents and conspiracy to defraud the United
States.”3 Iqbal was designated as a person “of high interest” and was
placed in the Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit of the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC).4
Iqbal pled guilty to the criminal charges and was deported to Pakistan
where he filed charges against thirty-four current and former federal officials.5 Focusing on his treatment at the MDC, Iqbal alleged violations of
his constitutional rights.6 Specifically, Iqbal alleged that he was designated
as a person of high interest because of his race, religion, or national origin,
in violation of his First and Fifth Amendment rights.7 Among the federal
officials named as defendants by Iqbal were Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Robert Mueller and United States Attorney General
John Ashcroft.8 Iqbal alleged that “‘each [defendant] knew of, condoned,
and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject’ [him] to harsh conditions
of confinement ‘. . . solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.’”9 Ashcroft and Mueller moved to dismiss for failure to state sufficient allegations to show their
involvement in clearly established unconstitutional conduct.10 The district
court denied this motion.11
The Supreme Court, however, determined that Iqbal failed to state a
cause of action under the standard set forth in the recently decided case Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.12 The Court remanded the case, which afforded
Iqbal the opportunity to amend his complaint.13

2. Id.
3. Id. at 1943.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1943-44.
7. Id. at 1944.
8. Id.
9. Id. (quoting First Amended Complaint at 172a-173a, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No.
04-CV-1809(JG)(SMG), 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part sub nom. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)) (third alteration in original).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (holding that in order to meet the pleading requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the “no set of facts” standard established in Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), is an insufficient protection against disruptive discovery and
that a plaintiff must plead enough facts to show that he is entitled to relief).
13. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954.
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It was significant to the outcome of this case that Iqbal was forced to rely solely on an implied cause of action, known as a Bivens cause of action,
rather than a claim sanctioned by Congress through statute.14
This Note examines the propriety of a statutory replacement for the Bivens action. Part I of this Note outlines the history of implied causes of action generally, including the shifting attitude of the Court toward its power
to fill gaps through the use of implied causes of action, as well as the
Court’s attitude toward the Bivens action specifically. Part II examines the
arguments for and against the adoption of a statutory replacement for Bivens in the context of the United States post-9/11. Part III contemplates a
statutory replacement for Bivens, which would strike a balance between deterring rogue government individuals and protecting government officials
who violate constitutional rights in the good faith execution of their jobs.
I. THE SHIFTING ATTITUDE OF THE COURT TOWARD BIVENS
A.

The History of Bivens

Implied causes of action are judicially-created causes of action that fill
gaps where the legislature has not acted, but the court infers that a remedy
exists to redress the particular harm at issue.15 Although “[t]here is no federal general common law,”16 federal courts still have common law-making
powers in specific areas, including the gap-filling function provided by implied causes of action.17 Implied causes of action were used frequently by
the Warren Court and continued to be favored during the years immediately
following Chief Justice Warren’s retirement,18 when the Court decided Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.19
14. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. In the opening portion of its opinion,
the Iqbal majority explicitly stated that implied causes of action are disfavored. Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1948. This signified the disadvantage Iqbal faced by having to bring an implied
cause of action rather than a statutory cause of action.
15. See David C. Nutter, Note, Two Approaches to Determine Whether an Implied
Cause of Action Under the Constitution is Necessary: The Changing Scope of the Bivens
Action, 19 GA. L. REV. 683, 683 (1985).
16. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
17. See Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1639, 1643 (2008) (“Justice Jackson famously defended this sort of interstitial lawmaking by contending that ‘[w]ere we bereft of the common law, our federal system would
be impotent. This follows from the recognized futility of attempting all-complete statutory
codes . . . .’” (quoting D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942) (Jackson,
J., concurring))).
18. See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court Puts Ideology Aside in Deciding a Small
But Important Ohio Election Case that Could Affect the 2008 Presidential Election, FINDLAW (Oct. 21, 2008), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20081021.html (noting that the
Warren Court freely implied causes of action and viewed this gap-filling function as a duty
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The Supreme Court in Bivens implied a cause of action that made monetary damages an available remedy for a federal official’s violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, even though the Constitution itself
does not specifically provide for such a remedy.20 The Court had considered a similar situation twenty-five years earlier in Bell v. Hood,21 where a
claim was made that federal investigators violated the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights of an individual.22 The Court held that general jurisdiction gave federal courts the power to use “any available remedy” to correct
the violation of a constitutional right.23 The Court did not, however, answer the question of whether a federal court could find an implied right to
damages as a remedy under the Constitution.24 In 1971, the Bivens Court
picked up where Hood left off.
The majority in Bivens noted that, although “the Fourth Amendment
does not in so many words provide for its enforcement by an award of
money damages,” it is “well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the
wrong done.”25 The majority went on to conclude that because there were
“no special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress,” the remedy could be granted by the Court.26
In citing potential special factors that would counsel hesitation, the
Court implied that it did not fully embrace the Bivens decision as one resting purely on a right arising out of the Constitution.27 The Court’s failure
to identify the specific legal grounds on which Bivens stands has created
the issue of how to reconcile the overlapping powers of the judiciary and

of the Court); see also J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (stating that “[i]t is
for the federal courts ‘to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief’ where federally secured rights are invaded” (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 687, 684 (1946))).
19. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
20. Id. at 395-96.
21. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
22. Id. at 679.
23. Id. at 684.
24. Id. at 684-85.
25. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
26. Id. The “special factors counseling hesitation” language was important in later cases
when the Court determined that where Congress has acted by providing any remedy, even a
remedy not as effective as Bivens, Bivens may not be extended. See infra notes 56-58 and
accompanying text.
27. See generally George D. Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs—
Have the Bivens Dissenters Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J. 263 (1989) (arguing that the Court
could have resolved the issue using a more straightforward analysis).
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the legislature with regard to remedies for constitutional violations.28 As
this Note later discusses, the failure of the Court to take a firm stance on its
power to create federal common law in this area has given the current
Court ammunition with which to limit Bivens remedies.29
In his dissent from the Bivens majority, Chief Justice Burger took the
unusual step of expressly calling upon Congress to create a statute akin to
42 U.S.C. § 1983,30 which would grant a statutory cause of action for damages against federal officials who violate an individual’s constitutional
rights.31 Justice Burger’s recommendation of a statute to replace Bivens
made clear that he agreed with the majority that the cause of action should
exist. Nevertheless, he disagreed over whether the Court had the power to
judicially create the Bivens cause of action, believing that the Court’s action was a violation of the separation of powers.32
In addition to the majority and dissenting opinions, Justice Harlan filed a
separate concurring opinion in which he agreed with the majority that
granting a cause of action for damages was the appropriate response because “[f]or people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”33 Read literally, this statement implies that a plaintiff can only succeed on a Bivens
claim if damages are the only possible remedy for the specific situation at
issue before the court.34 This type of analysis, combined with the “special
factors” language found in the majority’s opinion, has also fueled the current Court’s narrow interpretation of Bivens.35

28. Id. Professor Brown argues that the Bivens Court could have reasoned, in a
straightforward way, “that the plaintiff asserted a right under the Constitution, that the federal courts have jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution, and thus, that they
have the power and the duty to award damages if a compensable violation of constitutional
rights is shown.” Id. at 269. This analysis would not have required the “special factors”
language which has recently been used by the current Court to strike down Bivens claims.
See infra Part I.B.
29. See infra Part I.B.
30. Section 1983 grants a statutory cause of action for damages against state or local
actors by providing in part: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
31. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 412, 422-23 (Burger, J., dissenting).
32. Id.; see also Brown, supra note 27, at 267 (explaining that the dissent viewed the
creation of the Bivens remedy as truly a legislative task and only Congress could create this
type of cause of action).
33. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
34. See Nutter, supra note 15, at 691.
35. See id. at 694-95 (stating that the Court has adopted the “Damages or Nothing Approach” in analyzing Bivens claims, which requires damages to be the only potential remedy, and thus significantly restricts the availability of Bivens awards).
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Despite Chief Justice Burger’s dissenting opinion, Congress did not act
to replace Bivens. The cause of action was embraced by the Court and enjoyed a decade of expansion, exemplified by the Court’s decisions in Davis
v. Passman,36 where the Court extended the Bivens cause of action to Fifth
Amendment claims, and Carlson v. Green,37 where the Court extended Bivens to the Eighth Amendment. Lower courts also adopted the rationale of
the majority and extended Bivens causes of action to First38 and Sixth39
Amendment claims.
Since the Court’s decision in Bivens, the views of the Bivens majority
and dissent about the power of the Court to infer causes of action have been
a central issue of contention with the current Court recently favoring the
views of the Bivens dissent.40 It is unclear, however, whether the current
Court strictly rejects its role as gap-filler because of separation of powers
concerns, or if it only rejects its gap-filler function when it disagrees with
the policy choice of the law in question. Bivens provides an example of a
controversial policy choice in the eyes of the Court. Causes of action for
damages against federal agents, and the government more generally, tend
to be disfavored by certain political constituencies.41 If the current Court
sympathizes with those sentiments, there might be an alternative reason for
its resistance to extensions of Bivens.42
Although it is unlikely that the Court will ever spell out its motivations
entirely, there are some commentators who blatantly state that whether or
not causes of action like Bivens are favored depends on the political leanings of the Court.43 A popular legal blogger articulates the issue plainly:
Conservatives hate Bivens. Liberals love it. There are fantastic arguments for love and hate. Some conservatives say that Article III courts
lack the power to create common-law causes of action. Plus, conservatives, as a matter of realpolitik, don’t like lawsuits against the police. On
the former point, liberals say that’s silly: There is indeed a substantial

36. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
37. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
38. See, e.g., McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536 (6th Cir. 1996); Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6
F.3d 789, 794 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc); Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371 (3d Cir.
1981).
39. Wounded Knee Legal Def./Offense Comm. v. FBI, 507 F.2d 1281 (8th Cir. 1974).
40. See infra Part I.B.
41. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Supervisory Liability Under Bivens and Section 1983, CRIME
& FEDERALISM (July 26, 2009), http://federalism.typepad.com/crime_federalism/2009/07/
ashcroft-v-iqbal-supervisory-liability-under-bivens.html [hereinafter CRIME & FEDERALISM]
(stating that causes of action against the government are disfavored by conservatives).
42. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., CRIME & FEDERALISM, supra note 41.
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body of federal common law. On the latter point, liberals say nothing.
Pointing out conservative’s pro-government bias is bad manners.44

Regardless of the reason, whether it is the Court’s perception of the limitations of its power, or its distaste for causes of action against the government, it is clear that the current Court disfavors Bivens.45
The next portion of this Note discusses the current Court’s view of Bivens more thoroughly, including how sections of the majority and concurring opinions of Bivens have recently been used by the Court to limit the
Bivens cause of action.
B.

The Current Court’s Attitude Toward Bivens

Implied causes of action are now explicitly disfavored by the Supreme
Court.46 Some believe that Bivens is treated as a matter of discretionary relief that can be cut back at the Court’s will, rather than a decision that binds
the Court through stare decisis.47 Ironically, the primary reasons that the
Court has given for declining to extend Bivens stem from the Bivens majority and concurring opinions.48
The Bivens majority indicated that there were two potential exceptions to
the extension of the cause of action.49 The first exception provides that a
remedy may be available where the case involves “no special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.”50 The
44. Id.
45. See infra Part I.B.
46. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009) (stating that implied causes of
action are disfavored and the Court is reluctant to extend liability to new categories of defendants). Although the subject, in its entirety, is beyond the scope of this Note, it is far
from clear that the Court is correct in analyzing implied causes of action as disfavored when
compared to statutory causes of action absent congressional action rejecting the judicially
created cause of action. In fact, gap-filling has been recognized as an important role for the
Court, in that it assists the legislature by acknowledging that it is sometimes impossible to
create all-inclusive statutory codes. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. For more on
this subject, see Nutter, supra note 15, at 688 n.19, and CRIME & FEDERALISM, supra note 41
(“[C]onservative justices, when they can, limit Bivens . . . [by writing] opinions which state:
‘Because implied causes of action are disfavored, the Court has been reluctant to extend Bivens liability to any new context or new category of defendants.’” (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
at 1948)).
47. See Michael C. Dorf, Iqbal: The Bivens Dicta, DORF ON LAW (May 18, 2009, 3:48
PM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2009/05/iqbal-bivens-dicta.html [hereinafter The Bivens
Dicta].
48. See Brown, supra note 27, at 273-74 (noting that congressional action providing
some sort of relief for the complained of conduct is viewed by the current Court as a bar to
Bivens recovery).
49. See id. at 270.
50. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
396 (1971).
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second exception, again deferring to Congress, states that “we have here no
explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer’s
violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from
the agents.”51 These exceptions suggest that the Court’s power to grant the
damages remedy is subject to congressional revocation. Thus, Congress, as
explained by the Court in Carlson v. Green,52 may preclude damage relief
in Bivens actions by granting alternative remedies.53
In Bush v. Lucas,54 the Court declined to extend Bivens liability to a First
Amendment violation claim where Congress had already developed a comprehensive remedy scheme.55 The Bush Court treated the congressional
remedy as a “special factor[] counseling hesitation,” thus blurring the two
exceptions into one exception, namely, congressional creation of a remedy.56 The Court in Bush noted that Congress’ consideration of the issue
meant that this was a case where the wrong would be redressed even without the extension of an implied damages remedy.57 The Court rejected the
claim that the Bivens remedy must be granted because Congress’ solution
was not as effective as Bivens.58 Instead, the Court held that the congressional remedy need only be constitutionally adequate,59 and noted that
Congress was better suited to weigh the costs and benefits of the competing
policy considerations of remedies.60
Thus, the Court has taken the position that the relief made available by
Congress need not be as effective as damages relief provided by Bivens.
This belief reflects the viewpoint of the “Damages or Nothing Approach”
of Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, if that language is read literally as a
requirement to granting Bivens relief.61 Bush also echoes Bivens dissent by
making the claim that Congress is in a better position than the Court to determine the appropriate remedies for violations of constitutional rights.62

51. Id. at 397.
52. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
53. Id. at 18-19; see also Brown, supra note 27, at 271.
54. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
55. Id. at 390.
56. Note, Bivens Doctrine in Flux: Statutory Preclusion of a Constitutional Cause of
Action, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1251, 1251-52 (1988) [hereinafter Bivens Doctrine in Flux].
57. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 388-90.
58. Bivens Doctrine in Flux, supra note 56, at 1252.
59. Id. (noting that the constitutional adequacy standard leaves open a broad question as
to whether Congress can replace Bivens remedies by granting remedies that do not provide
meaningful protection of a plaintiff’s rights).
60. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 388-89.
61. See Nutter, supra note 15, at 692.
62. Compare Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 422 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (recommending that Congress, not the Court,
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Thus, Bush marks the shift of the Court toward both a narrow reading of
Bivens and an analysis that more closely aligns with the Bivens dissent.
This shift may be traced to Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Carlson v.
Green,63 where he encouraged the Court to overrule Bivens, making many
of the same arguments as the Bivens dissent.64 Rehnquist’s dissent stated
that Congress’ action to provide a remedy in the area at hand should be
dispositive because Congress has taken account of competing considerations in striking “what it considers to be an appropriate balance.”65
There is also evidence that other Justices have shifted their views on implied causes of action generally. Justice Kennedy, author of Iqbal, which
expressly stated that implied causes of action are disfavored by the Court,66
expressed the opposite view in an earlier opinion.67 In Virginia Bankshares, Justice Kennedy stated that by improperly attempting to limit implied causes of action, the Court was using “guerrilla warfare to restrict a
well-established implied right of action.”68 This language acknowledges
that implied causes of action are not treated with strict stare decisis application, and that even well-established implied rights of action are subject to
improper attack and limitation by the Court. Ironically, by the time Iqbal
reached the Court, Justice Kennedy was apparently prepared to use “guerrilla warfare” of his own to limit the extension of Bivens.69
Iqbal presents a new approach by the Court for limiting implied causes
of action. As opposed to using one of the Bivens exceptions to reject the
Bivens claim made by Iqbal, the Court used a procedural rule to limit the
cause of action at the pleading stage before discovery could occur.70 Specifically, in Iqbal, the Court extended the pleading standard announced in
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,71 requiring plaintiffs to file a complaint with
enough factual content, accepted as true, for the court to draw a reasonable

“should develop . . . [a] remedy”), with Bush, 462 U.S. at 388-89 (stating that “Congress is
in a far better position than a court” to create a remedy).
63. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
64. Id. at 32, 40-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 51, 53.
66. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009).
67. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
68. Id. at 1115 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although the
implied cause of action at issue in Virginia Bankshares was not a Bivens action, the language illustrates the shifting views of members of the Court as to whether or not implied
causes of action deserve a strict application of stare decisis, or whether, in the alternative,
the Court is free to use its discretion to grant these actions on a case by case basis.
69. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947-48.
70. See id. at 1953-54.
71. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct.72 This is an arguably stricter standard than the facial requirement of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, as Rule 8(a)(2) does not mention anything about alleging
facts to support a claim, but rather requires the pleader to state a claim for
which relief can be granted.73 Further, Form 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provides a sample complaint for negligence that simply
states the date and place where the incident occurred, the negligent action
of the defendant, and the allegation that the negligence resulted in the
plaintiff’s injury.74 The sample complaint does not include any further factual matter which would indicate, as the Court suggests in Twombly that it
should, regardless of whether the defendant is liable for the misconduct.75
Interpreting Rule 8(a)(2) more strictly is unlikely to have a significant
effect in most cases because plaintiffs’ lawyers tend to allege specific facts
in their complaints, regardless of the fact that Rule 8(a)(2) contains no such
facial requirement.76 Furthermore, in most cases where a pleading is found
to be insufficient, the court will grant leave to amend the complaint.77 Rule
8(a)(2) assumes that the party has access to the information needed to satisfy the Court’s pleading standard set forth in Twombly without the benefit of
discovery. However, in a case like Iqbal, where there is a significant informational asymmetry between the parties, this heightened requirement
could prove fatal to a plaintiff’s claim as much of the specific factual information related to defendants like Ashcroft will be inaccessible until the
discovery stage because it is not a matter of public record.78

72. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
73. According to Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading that states a claim for relief must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Significantly, prior to the Iqbal decision, some scholars argued that Twombly was limited to antitrust cases and the decision did not reinterpret Rule 8(a)(2) generally.
See Leading Case, Pleading Standards, 121 HARV. L. REV. 305, 310 n.51 (2007).
74. See FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11.
75. See id.
76. See Maxwell S. Kennerly, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Not Nearly As Important As You Think,
LITIGATION & TRIAL (June 29, 2009), http://www.litigationandtrial.com/2009/06/articles/
the-law/for-lawyers/ashcroft-v-iqbal-not-nearly-as-important-as-you-think/.
77. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (stating that the court may grant leave for the party to
amend a complaint and that the court should freely grant this leave when justice requires).
78. See Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and the
Paradox of Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905, 928 (2010) (arguing that, because of the impossibility of a plaintiff possessing all of the necessary information, cases will be dismissed).
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Given that Bivens is Disfavored, What Options Does the Court or
Congress Have?

The fact that the Court has been hostile toward Bivens and other implied
causes of action begs the question: What is the future of Bivens liability?
The answer depends heavily on which government branch takes action.
One possibility is that the Court will continue chipping away at Bivens
liability, effectively eviscerating it as a cause of action. By refusing to extend or expand Bivens liability, individual government employees will be
effectively immune to suits for violations of constitutional rights. This indemnification would save government resources that otherwise would be
spent on discovery and defense for government actors.79 The downside,
however, is that victims would be forced to bear all costs of constitutional
violations, which some might consider an intolerable outcome.
Alternatively, the Court could explicitly overturn Bivens. This would
make clear that no cause of action allowing recovery of damages exists for
violations of constitutional rights and all parties would adjust their behavior
accordingly. By overturning Bivens, the Court would take a more
straightforward approach that would send a clearer signal to victims about
their realistic recovery options. Further, the explicit lack of a judicial Bivens remedy might put pressure on lawmakers to take action, which the Bivens dissent and the current Court would likely prefer.80
Finally, even without the Court overturning Bivens, Congress could
enact a statute creating a cause of action for damages for violations of constitutional rights by government officials. This would eliminate the uncertainty created by the Court’s broad discretion to grant or deny the cause of
action and would legitimize the cause of action for those on the Court who
disfavor either implied causes of action generally or Bivens causes of action
specifically.81
This Note recommends that Bivens be codified and replaced by statute.
The second portion of this Note examines the arguments for and against the

79. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public
Officials’ Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 67 (1999) (noting that, almost
without exception, the government represents or pays for representation of federal officials
accused of violating constitutional rights). Further, the government pays the settlements and
damages of these actions in most cases. Id. If Bivens liability were never extended, these
costs would be avoided.
80. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
81. See generally Michael B. Hedrick, Note, New Life for a Good Idea: Revitalizing Efforts to Replace the Bivens Action with a Statutory Waiver of the Sovereign Immunity of the
United States for Constitutional Tort Suits, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1055 (2003) (arguing
that Congress should amend the Federal Tort Claims Act to create a statutory cause of action to replace Bivens).
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adoption of a statute granting a Bivens remedy of monetary damages to individuals whose constitutional rights are violated by federal officials.
II. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST A CODIFICATION OF BIVENS
This section of the Note gives an overview of the arguments that have
been advanced both in favor of, and against, the adoption of a statute to replace Bivens as an implied cause of action in the current, post-9/11 context.
A. Arguments for Replacing Bivens by Statute
Proponents of the adoption of a statute to replace Bivens first argue that
the post-9/11 environment requires that there be certainty as to the availability of damages against the government and its agents for violations of
constitutional rights.82 In the wake of 9/11, Congress expanded the federal
government’s internal security powers, as illustrated by the adoption of the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of
2001.83 The USA PATRIOT Act amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act84 to allow the issuance of warrants without a showing of
probable cause provided the warrant is for a significant intelligencegathering purpose.85 The USA PATRIOT Act also allows the government
to track email and internet usage.86 Through these and other provisions of
the Act, the federal government has gained the power, once reserved to the
states, to monitor individuals in a way that potentially implicates constitutional rights.87 By allowing the federal government greater access to individuals’ information, the USA PATRIOT Act creates a greater likelihood
of constitutional violations. These violations must be addressed by Bivens

82. See, e.g., id. at 1060 (arguing that the 9/11 terrorist attacks redefined the federal
government’s role in internal security).
83. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
84. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
85. See Hedrick, supra note 81, at 1060 n.49 (stating that before the USA PATRIOT
Act, the government was required to make a showing of “probable cause that the primary
purpose of the request was gathering intelligence on a foreign target”).
86. See USA PATRIOT Act § 216.
87. See Hedrick, supra note 81, at 1061. These provisions have potential Fourth
Amendment implications, as some argue that the USA PATRIOT Act itself sanctions official disregard of Fourth Amendment rights. Id. Further, because of the significant correlation between national origin, race, religion, and those being monitored after the 9/11 attacks,
Fourteenth Amendment issues could arise.
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rather than 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which applies only to state officials.88 However, because the Court currently disfavors implied causes of action, as
evidenced by the Iqbal decision,89 Bivens may be an inadequate device for
protecting constitutional rights in the post-Iqbal era.90 For this reason,
some argue for the adoption of a statute to replace Bivens so that the cause
of action would no longer be a matter of the Court’s discretion and there
would be certainty about the availability of relief.91
A second argument for the adoption of a statute to replace Bivens responds to the concern that allowing recovery of damages from federal
agents who violate constitutional rights would create chilling effects that
would hamper agents’ abilities to perform and be decisive on the job.92
Proponents of the replacement of Bivens by statute argue that any chilling
effects created by the statute would be limited to rogue officials and, therefore, would not deter federal agents from taking needed action for fear of
personal liability.93 This argument is based on the assumption that the
government would continue to allow indemnification unless a violation of
clearly established law had occurred.94 The chilling effects are thus limited
to rogue officials, because only rogue agents would be personally responsible for damages from a violation—all others would be indemnified by the
government.95 Because this is the exact type of conduct the law intends to
deter, the chilling effect is an argument for adoption of a statute. Further,
because government indemnity is already available under Bivens, new costs
would not necessarily arise from the creation of a statutory replacement. In
fact, if done correctly, the costs to the government and ultimately the taxpayers could potentially be reduced.96

88. See infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
90. An example of the inadequacy of the Bivens remedy is that plaintiffs’ cases will be
dismissed where the plaintiff lacks the necessary information to meet the new, heightened
pleading standard. See Kilaru, supra note 78.
91. See Hedrick, supra note 81, at 1063 (noting that a major benefit of a statutory replacement for Bivens is the “alleviation of uncertainty regarding the interaction of Bivens
actions and other congressional schemes”).
92. See David L. Noll, Note, Qualified Immunity in Limbo: Rights, Procedure, and the
Social Costs of Damages Litigation Against Public Officials, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 918-19
(2008).
93. See Pillard, supra note 79, at 77-78.
94. Id. at 77.
95. Any current chilling effect is limited to uncertainty in the indemnification law,
which could be limited by statute. See id.
96. See discussion infra Part III.
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Of great concern to the Court in Twombly and Iqbal was the potential for
non-meritorious claims to cause disruptive discovery for defendants.97
Another argument for a statute replacing Bivens is that Congress could provide for limited discovery, as was contemplated by the Second Circuit in
Iqbal v. Hasty.98 The Second Circuit suggested that limited discovery
could strike a balance between the qualified immunity defense allowed to
government officials and the liberal pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2),
while also limiting discovery costs for defendants and protecting privileged
information.99 The majority in Ashcroft v. Iqbal explicitly rejected the
suggestion of limited discovery through its discretion in allowing Bivens
cases to proceed.100 However, if a statute replaced Bivens, Congress could
authorize courts to allow limited discovery before deciding whether cases
should be dismissed.101
Finally, proponents of the adoption of a statute to replace the Bivens decision argue that a statute would create needed symmetry between causes
of action against state and federal officials.102 In contrast with 42 U.S.C. §
1983,103 which provides a cause of action against state agents who violate
federal constitutional rights under the color of law,104 Bivens is the only
cause of action available that provides monetary damages to individuals
whose constitutional rights are violated by federal agents. Although initially there may have been symmetry between Bivens and § 1983 causes of action, the disfavored treatment of Bivens by the Court has eliminated that
symmetry so that individuals whose rights are violated by federal agents
have fewer remedies than those whose rights are violated by state actors.105

97. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (noting that in light of an increasing caseload in federal
courts, parties should not advance into the discovery stage when there is “no reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs can construct a claim from the events related in the complaint”
(citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984))).
98. 490 F.3d 143, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2007).
99. See id.
100. See 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (refusing to allow Iqbal’s complaint to go forward even with
discovery controls such as in camera review in place, because “the question presented by a
motion to dismiss a complaint for insufficient pleadings does not turn on the controls placed
upon the discovery process”).
101. This approach was also suggested by Justice Stevens in the Twombly dissent. See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 596-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven if there is abundant evidence
that the allegation is untrue, directing that the case be dismissed without even looking at any
of that evidence marks a fundamental- and unjustified-change in the character of pretrial
practice.”).
102. See Brown, supra note 27, at 265-66.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
104. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
105. Brown, supra note 27, at 265-66.
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The Court, in Butz v. Economou,106 compared the two causes of action in
the context of immunity defenses and determined that it would be impossible to distinguish “between suits brought against state officials under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against
federal officials.”107 If it is impossible to distinguish between the officials
in terms of immunity defenses, why should there be a nearly outcomedeterminative distinction in terms of one’s ability to bring the actions?
Without the broad judicial discretion enjoyed by the Court under Bivens,
this outcome-determinative asymmetry could be eliminated.
B. Arguments Against Replacing Bivens by Statute
This section describes the arguments advanced against extending liability for monetary damages to government officials who violate an individual’s constitutional rights.
One common argument against extending liability is that the fear of liability will create a chilling effect that will deter federal agents from taking
required action in their line of work.108 This argument assumes that government agents fear that if a suit is brought against them they will personally have to pay damages or legal fees, rather than have the government indemnify them for these costs.109 Such fears would disincentivize necessary
official action where the law is novel or unclear.
Fear of a “flood of litigation” is another common argument.110 The fear
is that the creation of a cause of action against government actors who violate constitutional rights will produce a flood of non-meritorious litigation
that will clog the court system and impose deadweight losses on the government.111 “Deadweight loss” is an economic term, which describes a situation in which the outcome is not Pareto optimal.112 The argument is that
non-meritorious claims produce deadweight loss, which in turn imposes
costs on society that make society and defendants worse off without making anyone better off.113

106. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
107. Id. at 504.
108. See Noll, supra note 92.
109. See Pillard, supra note 79, at 78.
110. Noll, supra note 92, at 919-20.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 919 n.47 (defining Pareto optimal outcomes as outcomes where a party cannot
be made better off without making another party worse off). Under this definition, the chilling effect argument discussed above, supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text, can also
be understood as a deadweight loss avoidance argument.
113. Noll, supra note 92 at 919 n.47.
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A third argument against extending Bivens liability, advanced by the Iqbal majority itself, is that claims against the government can impose costly
and disruptive discovery.114 Among these costs is the fear that privileged
or confidential government information could be leaked through the discovery process.115 This leads to a second chilling effect argument, namely,
that the political decision-making process will be disrupted if government
agents fear liability for participation in frank discussions that could later be
discoverable and to which liability could attach.116
A final argument against adopting a statutory replacement for Bivens
flows from the recognition that in most cases, the government, and thus the
taxpayers, bear the ultimate cost of Bivens litigation.117 By denying a cause
of action against federal officials accused of violating an individual’s constitutional rights, the government is able to save resources that likely would
have been spent defending against the action and paying damages.
The next part of this Note advances the arguments in favor of replacing
Bivens and advocates for the adoption of a statute by Congress. Part III includes a discussion of the form that the statute could take in order to
achieve both efficiency and access to justice.118
III. CONGRESS SHOULD ADOPT A STATUTE TO REPLACE BIVENS
In order to reach the conclusion that Congress should adopt a statute to
replace Bivens, it is necessary to reexamine some of the arguments against
statutory replacement.
The first of these arguments is that granting a cause of action in damages
against federal agents would have a chilling effect on agents’ actions,
which sometimes would cause agents to fail to take needed action for fear
of personal liability.119 Given the current use of government indemnification in Bivens cases, the chilling effect argument is unsatisfactory. Because
the federal government assumes the costs of defending virtually all Bivens

114. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
115. See Noll, supra note 92, at 920.
116. See id. at 920-21.
117. See Pillard, supra note 79, at 76 (acknowledging that when indemnification occurs,
it is the taxpayers who foot the bill); see also Noll, supra note 92, at 918 (listing a lawyer’s
availment of government resources in a Bivens case as a direct cost of the cause of action).
118. In advocating for a statutory replacement of Bivens, this Note is not implying that
Bivens, as a matter of federal common law, stands on inferior ground as compared to congressionally created law. Rather, this Note acknowledges the current Court’s position on
Bivens, and argues for statutory replacement to eliminate the current Court’s discretionary
power to make the cause of action available.
119. See Noll, supra note 92.
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actions,120 the chilling effect on agents would be limited to those few cases
where indemnification is unavailable. Indemnification is most commonly
unavailable when the violation occurs outside of the scope of employment
or when indemnification is not in the interest of the United States.121 Because of the very limited scope of personal liability in Bivens cases, the
chilling effect argument begins to unravel when indemnification is considered.
The second argument that must be reexamined posits that the deadweight losses flowing from non-meritorious claims create Pareto inefficiencies, which justify disallowing the cause of action in its entirety.122
While the filing of non-meritorious claims is clearly inefficient, this argument views the effects of these non-meritorious claims in a bubble. It
would be more useful to analyze the situation using a Kaldor-Hicks, rather
than Pareto, efficiency measurement.123 Kaldor-Hicks efficiency analysis
compares the total costs and benefits of having a cause of action against
government officials generally available.124 The cost-benefit analysis
would then compare the aggregate costs imposed (including litigation
costs, deadweight loss from non-meritorious claims, and any chilling effect
on government officials)125 with the aggregate benefits realized (including
deterring constitutional violations, granting a remedy for loss incurred due
to constitutional violations, and increasing public confidence in a system
with safeguards against rogue government officials). This examination and
weighing of the total costs and benefits is more appropriate than a Pareto
optimal analysis because of the complexity (or impossibility) of taking any
widespread government action that makes some better off without making
anyone worse off.
120. See Pillard, supra note 79, at 67.
121. See id. at 77 & n.56 (“A typical example of a Bivens case in which a public employee would not be represented and indemnified by the government is one in which the
employee is under criminal investigation or prosecution by the government for the conduct
that gave rise to the constitutional tort suit.”).
122. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
123. Compare Economic Definition of Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency, ECONOMIC GLOSSARY,
http://glossary.econguru.com/economic-term/Kaldor-Hicks+efficiency (last visited Sept. 12,
2010) (“A type of efficiency that results if the monetary value of society’s resources are
maximized.”), with Economic Definition of Pareto Efficiency, ECONOMIC GLOSSARY,
http://glossary.econguru.com/economic-term/Pareto+efficiency (last visited Sept. 12, 2010)
(“A type of efficiency that results if one person can not be made better off without making
someone else worse off.”).
124. See Economic Definition of Kaldor-Hicks Improvement, ECONOMIC GLOSSARY,
http://glossary.econguru.com/economic-term/Kaldor-Hicks+improvement (last visited Sept.
12, 2010) (“[I]f those gains exceed those losses, or the benefits exceed the costs, then social
welfare is improved and undertaking the action provides a net benefit to society.”).
125. See Noll, supra note 92, at 918-22.
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The third argument that must be reexamined is the “disruptive discovery” argument, which alleges that the creation of a statutory cause of action
against federal officials could lead to costly or harmful discovery for defendants.126 As previously discussed, this issue was of particular concern
to the Court in Twombly and Iqbal.127 Although the Court took the position
that absent a pleading of specific facts alleging a violation the case must be
dismissed, it could have adopted a more moderate approach and allowed
limited discovery. In fact, the Second Circuit suggested such an approach
in Iqbal v. Hasty.128 This approach would have balanced the needs of
plaintiffs alleging violations by high level officials as well as of defendants
and the court system in limiting costs and protecting privileged and confidential information. Because much of the specific factual information related to high level government officials is arguably inaccessible until the
discovery stage of the proceeding, allowing for limited discovery in the absence of specific factual pleading ensures that government officials are not
shielded from liability, and thus provides the more balanced approach.
Given the inadequacy of the arguments against codifying Bivens, this
Note argues that Bivens should be replaced by a statute. This statute should
provide a cause of action allowing for general damages against federal officials who violate clearly established laws or invidiously attempt to take advantage of new or ambiguous laws. Alternatively, when federal agents, in
the good faith execution of their duties, violate new or ambiguous laws, the
government should indemnify the agents and limit damages to pecuniary
costs for the reasons set forth below.
A.

Where Clearly Established Law has Been Violated, a Cause of
Action Should be Available Against the Offending Agent

In determining the form that a statute replacing Bivens should take, it is
necessary to distinguish between situations where a government agent violates new or uncertain laws on the one hand, and on the other hand, situations where a government agent violates clearly established laws, and in so
doing, causes damage to the victim. In the latter situation, no indemnification of the government should be available to the agent, and the agent
should pay the full amount of proven damages.129
Such a rule limits the moral hazard problem that may exist when there is
an expectation that the government will pay any damages that arise while

126.
127.
128.
129.

See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
See 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2d Cir. 2007).
See infra Part III.B.
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on the job.130 Although some of this moral hazard problem is likely curbed
by the prospect of negative employment consequences, for example, the
possibility of losing one’s job for blatant legal violations, the possibility of
being held personally liable would further curb this problem to the extent
that internal mechanisms fail. Granting such a cause of action could also
strengthen the impact of internal controls because the enforcement of disciplinary proceedings depends upon the reporting of violations to the appropriate authorities. A statutory cause of action would give victims greater incentive to report abuses, which would in turn increase enforcement of
internal controls and give them more bite.
Additionally, where the agent acts upon personal motives and ultimately
violates the Constitution, it is difficult to argue that the government and the
taxpayers should be responsible for the cost of this intentional, invidious,
official misconduct.131 In fact, allowing indemnity in these circumstances
would mean that taxpayers would actually be subsidizing intentional unconstitutional conduct, which is clearly contrary to the purpose of indemnification.
The standard for imposing personal liability on a government official
must be a violation of clearly established law. Whether or not a law is
clearly established is a question of law.132 The clearly established law
standard is currently used by the Court to determine if qualified immunity
applies to the offending government official.133 Under the current system,
if qualified immunity applies, the suit does not move forward and the victim is left to bear all of the costs attributable to the violation.134 This Note
130. Moral hazard is a term used by economists to explain why individuals covered by
insurance engage in greater risk-taking than they would without insurance. See Economics
A-Z, ECONOMIST, http://www.economist.com/RESEARCH/ECONOMICS/alphabetic.cfm?
letter=M#moralhazard (last visited Sept. 12, 2010). In the case of indemnification, the ability to indemnify the government and escape payment of damages for violations of clearly
established law functions as insurance for the government agent. The moral hazard theory
suggests that because of indemnification, government agents engage in riskier behavior than
they would if they were expected to pay damages out of their own pockets. Some argue that
personal liability is needed to create effective deterrence of unconstitutional behavior. See
Pillard, supra note 79, at 75 (“If constitutional tort damages are simply a cost of business
passed on to government, officials might lack sufficient incentive to comply with constitutional commands.”).
131. See Pillard, supra note 79, at 76.
132. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-1809(JG)(SMG), 2005 WL 2375202, at *10
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143
(2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
133. Qualified immunity will bar suit for constitutional violations unless the defendant
violated “clearly established” law, whereas immunity will not be granted if the violation occurred based on uncertain or novel law. See Pillard, supra note 79, at 80.
134. Id. (“Qualified immunity is undoubtedly the most significant bar to constitutional
tort actions.”).
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argues that the statute adopted to replace Bivens should not include a qualified immunity provision, but rather, upon a showing by the defendant that
no violation of clearly established law has occurred, the government should
replace the agent as the defendant as the suit proceeds.135
Absent a showing by the agent that the violation was of a novel or ambiguous law, as opposed to a clearly established law, the case should move
forward against the government agent and the plaintiff should be able to recover general damages—including pecuniary,136 non-pecuniary,137 and
even punitive damages where appropriate. This allows the total cost of the
injury to be internalized by the wrongdoer, which creates optimal deterrence and, therefore, decreases the number of violations that occur.
Furthermore, the intentional wrongdoer is the cheapest cost-avoider of
the violation.138 In most cases, choosing not to intentionally violate clearly
established constitutional rights is cost-free.139 Thus, efficiency will be
promoted by placing the costs of violations on the wrongdoer, rather than
on the victim who would have to purchase loss insurance to protect himself, or on the taxpayer who would have to use the democratic system to
put potentially costly safeguards into place in order to eliminate violations.140
Thus, where clearly established law has been violated, efficiency and the
principles of justice will place the full cost of the violation on the rogue
government official.141
135. See infra Part III.B.
136. Pecuniary damages include hospital bills, destroyed property, and other calculable
expenses related to the violation. For a definition of monetary damages generally, see
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 447 (9th ed. 2010).
137. Non-monetary damages include pain and suffering and loss of consortium resulting
from a violation. See id.
138. The cheapest cost-avoider is the party that could avoid the harm at the lowest cost.
See Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 VA.
L. REV. 1291, 1292 (1992); see also Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for
Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 n.19 (1972) (defining the cheapest cost
avoider as the party who the arbitrary initial cost bearer would find worthwhile to bribe in
order to obtain a change in behavior that would most lessen the cost of the accident).
139. This ignores the cost of lost utility to the would-be rogue government official, which
comes from denying him the opportunity to violate clearly established law on a subsidized
basis. This cost is viewed as insignificant for purposes of this Note.
140. See MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 7 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 8th ed. 2006) (explaining that in order to preserve
scarce resources, damages are assessed against defendants as a way of measuring the cost of
the violation, and the main function of liability is thus to bring about the efficient level of
safety).
141. Whether or not general damages should ever be available in terms of efficiency is
beyond the scope of this Note. However, because the current system embraces nonpecuniary damages for tortfeasors in most cases, see Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffer-
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The next part of this Note discusses situations in which no clearly established law has been violated, but a violation nevertheless occurred and the
victim suffered monetary losses.
B. Absent a Violation of Clearly Established Law, a Cause of Action
Against the Government Should Exist for Violations of an Individual’s
Constitutional Rights
As opposed to the current system, where the costs of violations of new
or uncertain laws are imposed on the victims, the statute adopted by Congress should provide a cause of action against the government for pecuniary losses suffered as a result of the violation of new or uncertain laws.142
In fact, if plaintiffs are able to show that their constitutional rights were violated, and that the violation caused monetary losses or damages, the government should be strictly liable to the plaintiff for those damages. This
would shift the cost of violations from the victim to the taxpayer, at least to
the extent that those losses are quantifiable. Shifting the cost of violations
of uncertain law to taxpayers effectively ensures that the cost is shared by
society rather than concentrated on individual victims.143
This is also an appropriate response because the government exists for
the benefit of society as a whole. The costs related to accidental violations
of constitutional rights are a cost of having government enforcement of
laws. These costs should be paid by all members of society, rather than by
the relatively small number of unfortunate victims, because all members of
society are beneficiaries of having an established government.144 Under
the current system, society is free-riding at the expense of victims by placing the entire cost of accidental violations upon them.
Placing the costs of accidental violations on the government has the added benefit of limiting the chilling effect on government agents caused by
violations of clearly established law. This provides a safe haven for discreing, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 164, 167
(2004), government actors who violate constitutional rights should not be immune from liability for any monetary recovery available to plaintiffs. This view is contrary to the arguments made in terms of the government in Part III.B of this Note. See infra Part III.B.
142. See Hedrick, supra note 81, at 1066 (arguing that an official’s good faith may be
relevant as to the cause of action against the official personally, but not relevant as to a
cause of action against the government).
143. One of the primary goals of strict liability is to spread the costs of accidental violations among a broad class of people in order to provide insurance against what would otherwise be a devastating loss for an individual. See Joseph H. King, Jr., A Goals-Oriented
Approach to Strict Tort Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities, 48 BAYLOR L. REV.
341, 350 (1996). Spreading accident costs is thus efficient because the costs cause less social and economic harm when spread among many people. See id.
144. See Pillard, supra note 79, at 82.
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tionary actions taken by government agents on the basis of new or uncertain law and will not deter them from taking necessary action through fear
of monetary liability. Actions that violate clearly established law, however,
are effectively deterred because of the certainty that liability for the costs of
that violation will attach to the wrongdoer.145
In contrast with the availability of general damages to a plaintiff who is
the victim of a violation of clearly established law, the damages attributable
to a violation of novel or uncertain law should be limited to the calculable
pecuniary loss incurred.
There are several reasons for limiting the damages paid by the government to pecuniary damages. The first reason is that it is not as important,
for deterrence purposes, that the government pay the full cost of the loss.
This is because the government does not respond to economic incentives in
the same manner as individuals and corporations.146 The government responds to many noneconomic considerations, including public satisfaction
and approval, special interest group requests, safety and security needs, and
environmental concerns.147 The government may simply pay judgments
from the tax pool without changing its behavior because it does not feel
monetary loss in the same way an individual does.148 Because causing the
government to internalize the non-pecuniary losses suffered by the victim
likely would not discourage future violations, there is no deterrence justification for covering non-pecuniary losses. If deterrence of government
agents were the only consideration, the same analysis would apply to pecuniary losses. Thus, further justification is needed to support limiting the
damages available to plaintiffs to monetary losses when the government is
defending this type of action.
The second factor that must be considered is the nature of plaintiff compensation for non-pecuniary losses. Professor Richard Abel argues that

145. Under the current system, uncertainty about the ability of a government agent to indemnify the government can have a chilling effect on agents making discretionary decisions
based on new or uncertain law. See id. at 78. However, the risk that an individual agent
“would be left paying [his own] damages is negligible under the current system.” Id.
146. See Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect
of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 846 (2001) (discussing the unique
problems associated with determining how government incentives function, including the
fact that some sort of political capital might be exchanged or valued rather than money).
147. See id. at 849 (acknowledging that the government responds to political rather than
economic incentives).
148. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 353 (2000). For a different approach to
the issue, see Gilles, supra note 146, at 859-67 (describing the “other important reasons why
we should reasonably expect government to respond to the imposition of constitutional tort
damage remedies”).
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non-pecuniary losses are incoherent, incalculable, and incommensurable,149
and thus are not losses which should be covered by the government.150
While Professor Abel’s characterization of non-pecuniary losses as incoherent, incalculable, and incommensurate151 may be somewhat extreme, his
characterization of the fundamental problem as one of calculation is accurate. That is, even if non-pecuniary damages could be calculated, the cost
of doing so accurately would be prohibitively expensive in an already inefficient tort system,152 and the question would remain—how much money
effectively compensates victims for abstract losses like pain and suffering?153
The goal of awarding damages in tort law is to “return the plaintiff as
closely as possible to his or her condition before the accident.”154 In terms
of non-monetary damages, however, plaintiffs cannot be returned to their
pre-accident status. Plaintiffs cannot “unfeel” their pain and suffering; they
cannot replace the relationships lost by the wrongful deaths of loved ones.
Money cannot necessarily approximate the value of being free from these
losses in a meaningful way.155 Because of the impossibility of equating
monetary damages with non-monetary losses, damages for these losses
would not be available to plaintiffs who bring causes of action against the
government for violations of constitutional rights. Although this system
would force the victims to internalize the losses related to non-pecuniary
damages, these losses could not be compensated with money.156
The third reason for limiting government liability to pecuniary damages
is to protect taxpayers from paying for non-pecuniary losses that are not effectively compensated by money. Because juries are sympathetic to the
victims of these types of violations, it is possible that juries would award
large sums of money for pain and suffering even though the dollar amount

149. See generally Richard Abel, General Damages are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable, and Inegalitarian (but Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253
(2006).
150. Professor Abel argues that the tort system should not be in the business of covering
general non-pecuniary losses at all, and does not limit his argument to the government as
this Note does. See id.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 294-95 (discussing all of the potential complexities of calculating nonpecuniary damages).
153. See id. at 291.
154. Id. at 258.
155. Id. at 259 (“‘No one likes pain and suffering and most people would pay a good deal
of money to be free of them.’ But giving victims money does not free them from pain.”
(quoting Kwasny v. United States, 823 F.2d 194, 197 (7th Cir. 1987))).
156. See id. at 268 (noting that “money cannot buy nonexistence”).
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is arbitrary in relation to the loss.157 There is also the risk that money coming from the government tax pool would be viewed by the jury as “Monopoly Money,” causing them to award significant damages without considering the opportunity costs of such awards.158 In order to protect the tax pool
and government resources, the statute should not attempt to provide financial redress for non-pecuniary losses, which by definition cannot be compensated with money.
Although this system forces the victim to internalize the entire loss attributable to pain and suffering, society has the ability to effectively mitigate
this loss by paying pecuniary damages. Any monetary payment for pain
and suffering would simply shift wealth from society’s tax pool to the victim without granting meaningful relief. Because the goal is to find a system that effectively compensates victims while still maximizing efficiency
in the allocation of scarce resources in the tax pool, a statute replacing Bivens should exempt the government from covering non-pecuniary losses
caused by violations of new or uncertain constitutional rights.
Finally, under the suggested statute, if a violation of a new or unclear
law were to occur without causing monetary harm, the victim would be left
without a cause of action. Although at first glance this might seem undesirable, the arguments for excluding non-monetary damages also apply to a
scenario without identifiable monetary losses. The fact that there would be
no available cause of action does not mean that the victim of the violation
was not harmed; it simply means that society is willing to accept the small
probability of being the uncompensated victim because the costs that would
be imposed by an alternative system are greater than the benefits.
C.

Flat Non-Pecuniary Damage Award Option

For political or other noneconomic reasons, a statute that does not provide monetary damages for non-pecuniary losses might be viewed by some
as unacceptable and unadoptable. The next best alternative would be to cap
non-pecuniary damages at a relatively small dollar amount.159 This system
has the benefit of acknowledging the victims’ losses without giving juries
the discretion to award large damage amounts for noneconomic losses from
the tax pool. The goal of awarding these damages would be to give symbolic compensation to victims who suffer emotional or other noneconomic

157. Id. at 291-93.
158. The opportunity cost here would be all of the other uses that this tax money could go
toward if it did not go toward compensation for non-pecuniary losses.
159. If extinguishing non-pecuniary awards for these types of cases is politically impossible or socially undesirable, awards for emotional losses should be capped at a relatively low
figure in order to preserve scarce government resources.
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losses, as well as to extend causes of action to victims of violations who do
not suffer quantifiable monetary harms.
Further, the opportunity to recover damages up to the capped amount
would be an incentive for victims who suffer no economic damage but do
suffer emotional harm to bring suit. Giving victims a small award would
acknowledge that they were harmed by government action and may also
help them cope with the violation. While it is not customary to receive
apologies in our legal system, providing a small damages award may be the
only way a victim’s strictly noneconomic harm could be recognized.
CONCLUSION
Recent decisions suggest that, absent a congressional statute creating a
cause of action for violations of constitutional rights by federal officials,
the Court will continue to limit the Bivens doctrine.160 Iqbal illustrates that
the Court views the application of Bivens as discretionary, rather than deserving strict stare decisis deference.161 Further, the application of the
Twombly pleading standard to Bivens cases, as dictated by Iqbal, further
chips away at the Bivens cause of action, limiting plaintiffs’ ability to move
forward with discovery, and ultimately their ability to succeed on a
claim.162
In order to ensure that plaintiffs are afforded a meaningful opportunity to
obtain relief, Congress should adopt an efficient statute to replace Bivens.
An efficient version of that statute would deter rogue individual government officials by holding them liable for violations of clearly established
law. On the other hand, where there was uncertainty about the law, and the
government official executed his duties in good faith, the costs of any damages and litigation expenses would shift to the government. The adoption
of a statute to replace Bivens would ensure that a cause of action allowing
victims to recover damages for violations of their constitutional rights will
no longer depend on the Supreme Court’s view of its power to create such
actions.

160. See supra Part I.B.
161. See The Bivens Dicta, supra note 47.
162. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.

